Two versions of the side to side jumps. Focused on balance and rhythm for most of the players, but also trying to shoot quicker, improve hand placement, and raise some set points.

A basic drill from Blitz Basketball and Fake Fundamentals. Drive, kick to the corner and follow the pass to become the next shooter.

A related drill emphasizing the exit out after dribble penetration.

A simple competitive shooting drill I saw in a UConn women’s basketball practice/video over 20 years ago. Two passes and a shot. Three points for three-point field goals; two points for two-point field goals; one point for rebounding a missed shot and making a layup; and return to zero if a missed shot hits the ground. Shoot for two minutes.

Traditional form shooting with a player standing close to the basket and shooting repeatedly, often with one hand or no lower body involvement is a Fake Fundamental. The variable form shooting drill recreates the same idea, but the player explores different footwork for each repetition; no two repetitions are exactly the same.

Some examples of the various drills from the general movement series I use as Specific Practice. The various movements are used for different reasons for different players, but generally to encourage exploration in the pursuit of more optimal shooting techniques.

For more information, see Evolution of 180 Shooter: A 21st Century Guide.

String Shooting is a shooting and spacing drill with several variations from simple to more complex.

Group Drill

Same basic drill, but with three players only to make the drill continuous.

The same drill, but with a fourth player to add a defender.

And with a fifth player to create a three-vs-two drill.

Finally, 3v3 Wildcat.

Prior to Evolution of 180 Shooter: A 21st Century Guide, I remarked that my team did not do any form shooting during our practices, while shooting 37.4% from the three-point line and 72.6% from the free-throw line, both of which ranked in the NJCAA top 10. Naturally, someone replied, “Maybe you would have shot better if you did form shooting.”

Most coaches believe form shooting (Fake Fundamentals, Vol. 3) is the first step to great shooting performance.

If your shooting workouts don’t incorporate form shooting close to the basket, you won’t reach your potential as a shooter.

— Coach Mac 🏀 (@BballCoachMac) March 30, 2024

Therefore, incorporating form shooting should improve anyone’s shooting percentages regardless of current success. Nobody questions form shooting’s effectiveness despite the differences between most form shooting and game shots. Most great shooters start with form shooting, which confirms our beliefs. Form shooting is important, and it works, and therefore it is logical to suggest we would have improved by incorporating form shooting despite ranking in the top 10 in three-point and free-throw shooting. Few disagree.

We do not live in the multiverse, or at least we currently cannot access it, so we cannot test this hypothetical. We cannot re-play the season with the same players attempting the same shots against the same opponents, but with different practice drills. The statement is unfalsifiable.

People hold onto their beliefs, rather than accept evidence to the contrary, because we have confirmation bias, which is the tendency to favor information confirming or strengthening one’s beliefs or values, while disregarding contradictory information.  My example of elite shooting without form shooting is dismissed and does not affect entrenched beliefs.

I thought of this as people posted about Oakland University’s Jack Gohlke’s workouts after his monumental NCAA Tournament performance. Gohlke made 10 three-pointers against Kentucky, one short of the NCAA Men’s Basketball Tournament record, and another six in Oakland’s second-round loss.

He shot 37.6% from behind the three-point line this season, which ranked 63rd in NCAA Division 1 men’s basketball, roughly the same as our team’s shooting percentage.

Nobody questioned Gohlke’s shooting routine. Nobody suggested a different approach would have led to more success or better shooting percentages. Instead, coaches created posters to hang in their locker rooms to demonstrate to their players the work required to succeed at the NCAA Division 1 level.

The message is important; success requires effort and dedication. However, coaches latched onto this message, as opposed to my message about the lack of form shooting, because it fits their current beliefs. Gohlke’s extensive shooting routine confirmed their bias toward repetitions, practice hours, and grinding.

Nobody cared that while he is a great shooter, he was far from the best shooter this season. We played at a different competitive level, and obviously different genders, but our team had five shooters shoot better than 37.6% from the three-point line, and four on reasonably high volume (To preempt criticism, the best men’s shooter I trained as a shooting coach shot 42% from three-point line for his NCAA D1 career with a season-high of 46.1% and broke conference three-point shooting records).

One may argue shooting is more difficult in NCAA men’s basketball than women’s basketball, but statistics argue differently. NCAA D1 men’s basketball averaged 33-34% from the three-point line in the regular season this year, compared to 31-32% for NCAA D1 women’s basketball. From that perspective, our percentage was further from average than was Gohlke’s. Here are the shots from our 5th best shooter (by percentage) who was near his season percentage:

This is not to take away anything from Gohlke, as he is a great shooter who had a great season and provided the biggest highlight of the first weekend of the Men’s NCAA Tournament. Instead, this simply is to demonstrate our confirmation bias when it comes to skill development, shooting, practice design, and coaching. Coaches hold onto their beliefs, and find examples to confirm their biases, rather than search out new information or try new things that may help their players improve more or perform better during games. They rely on repetitions as the magic cure; but how many repetitions? Nobody can say.

Nobody will suggest, “Maybe if he practiced less or practiced differently he would have shot even better” because people believe in repetitions, block practice, and spot shooting. Coaches want their players to invest in this practice, even when other practice led to better results.

In all likelihood, any player investing this much time in shooting will improve. 750 shots in a day is a lot of shots. At the end of the day, that is the ultimate goal, regardless of the practice design.

What if the time spent accumulating these repetitions to demonstrate slight shooting improvements meant less time to improve weaknesses, such as speed, defense, dribbling, and more? He shot 38.2% for his NCAA D2 career, and 40.0% in his final NCAA D2 season. There are different ways to demonstrate shooting improvements, but his shooting percentages have been consistent since he began to receive consistent playing time. Maintaining those percentages at an NCAA D1 level against theoretically better, bigger, faster defenses is one way to demonstrate improvement. However, he also took eight shots inside the three-point line all season; maybe the volume of shooting practice prevented other improvements.

Coaches resists change because of confirmation bias due to examples such as Gohlke. A huge volume of practice led to a great shooting performance. See, practice more. Get your butt in the gym.

Just as I cannot prove form shooting would not have led to better shooting with my team, I cannot prove Gohlke would have shot the same or better percentage with less or different practice. It is unfalsifiable.

My evidence for our practice, however, is our players. Almost without exception, they shot lower percentages before and after their two junior-college seasons. This is a within-subjects design: We can compare the results from the same players who encountered two or more different training environments. Of course, it is far from objective, as too many variables affect shooting performance: Most prominently, different competitive levels, but also shot selection, system of play, coach, teammates, defense, and more.  For all I know, our shooting success was largely due to the players liking each other or playing together in a positive emotional state as opposed to the other environments in which they played before and after transferring. Practice design may not have had any effect.

However, for the most part, players changed their practice during their two years at junior college, engaging in more contested shooting and decision-making shooting practice through small-sided games and modified shooting drills than before or after. Many, once transferring to NCAA D1 programs, never practiced these shots again. Some teams used only isolated, block shooting drills during practice; others did not even practice shooting, relying instead on players to shoot on a shooting machine on their own time. Many coaches view our shooting drills as scrimmaging or playing and not true skill development, and do not incorporate them.

The players went through many changes when they transferred. It is difficult to compare situations, systems, styles of play, shot selection, playing time, opponents, and more. However, every single player shot better when practicing with more variable, defended, and decision-making shooting drills than when they no longer engaged in this practice.

Of course, this does not confirm the typical coaching bias, so coaches ignore these results, and attribute the differences to playing at a higher level (which is debatable, as we played opponents with multiple high-major players, whereas most of our players transferred to low-major programs) or the players not practicing hard enough.

This is not to suggest repetitions play no role in shooting development, nor is this in any way a criticism of Gohlke. Instead, this simply demonstrates the power of confirmation bias and seeking information to affirm our beliefs rather than questioning our current processes. How can we develop better players, or develop into better coaches, if we only trust the information confirming our current beliefs?

Originally published in Hard2Guard Player Development Newsletter, Volume 7.

I met a player who visited local universities in an attempt to earn a scholarship. No offer was forthcoming, and she signed with my junior-college program. I told her she attempted too many long two-point shots and had to shoot three-pointers this season (I recruited her as a 4, and she plays 2-5). When she arrived, she attempted three-point shots, but threw the ball rather than shooting. She used a long forward step with her right (shooting) foot and flung the ball at the basket with a flat trajectory. 

I initially directed her to shoot the ball higher, as I hoped this cue would encourage her to shoot up rather than out and lead to a technique shift. This did not help, as her lower body and upper body attempted to do different things; the lower body moved horizontally as the upper body moved vertically. The cue did not disrupt her long step. She regressed to her previous, comfortable technique after a few shots. 

Next, I asked her to jump into her shot rather than attempt other minor modifications. She jumped in different directions in one workout. She shot off hops and leaps onto one foot to prevent the long step-in footwork. She adopted the jump into her shot after a few workouts. The upper body essentially fixed itself. 

In October, she made her first five three-pointers and dominated a scrimmage with several NCAA DI programs in the gym.

Our assistant coach often yelled or mumbled that she was traveling as she made these changes. She did. She often caught the ball flat-footed, jumped into the air, landed, and jumped again to shoot. I rarely said anything through August and September, only occasionally instructing her to catch with feet in the air or to get her feet there more quickly. I was not concerned with her traveling; I was concerned with her shooting. We discussed the traveling once she was comfortable with her new shooting technique. 

Now, she often leaps into a one-two step, but her footwork is closer to a jump stop or one-count than the elongated step she used in August. She plays four positions, likely will shoot > 35% from the three-point line this season, and has committed to an NCAA DII program with a full scholarship for next year. 

Improving one skill was the difference between no scholarship offers and a full scholarship offer. Her improvement derived from one change, from my perspective. I perturbed her skill performance by requiring her to jump into the shot rather than step in to the shot. To amplify these perturbations, she jumped from different directions (90-degrees, 180-degrees, lateral, backward, etc.), and included hops and leaps and shots off of one foot. These perturbations differentiated the desired shooting technique from the habitual shooting technique, and she made significant changes, and improvements, in a matter of weeks at an age (20) when many coaches believe it is impossible to change one’s shooting technique. 

The lesson is not that a one-count is better than a two-count. The jump corrected a problem quicker and more permanently than attempting to alter the length of her step. Now that her new shot is somewhat habitual, she occasionally steps in to her shot or leaps into her shot with a one-two step with both feet off the ground on the catch and a left-right landing. She is able to vary her shooting footwork without reverting to her previous (flawed) shooting technique. She has learned a new shooting technique and demonstrated improvement, retention, adaptability, and transfer. 

Note: These ideas and more are included in Evolution of 180 Shooter: A 21st Century Guide.

Kevin Pelton is one of the best writers on ESPN and included this review of the Miami Heat’s pick in his overall review of the 2023 NBA Draft. This is a familiar refrain within the NBA and NBA media: Miami Heat develop players, and especially shooters. I am a Miami Heat fan and believe Eric Spoelstra is the best coach in the NBA, but, to me, this demonstrates the idea that once repeated enough, an idea becomes a fact.

People oftentimes confuse scouting and development, or at least the line between scouting and development is blurred and difficult to separate. The Heat play an unusually high number of undrafted players, which we equate with great player development. Why not scouting? Why not coaching?

We assume players must have improved greatly to go from undrafted to rotation players or G-League to NBA starters because we largely ignore the effect of environment on player performance. The Heat likely are the best organization at identifying the players who fit their style, their system, and their organization. They know who they are, and what they want, largely because of consistency and alignment in management and coaching with Pat Riley and Spoelstra. These players may excel in Miami simply because the organization identifies players who fit, and Spoelstra and staff give them opportunities and the confidence to play to their strengths and play through mistakes.

This is not to discount the coaching or the player development. Clearly, something happens to certain players in Miami, whether scouting, playing time, coaching, system, player development, or a combination. Miami is the NBA’s model franchise (along with San Antonio). However, even with the models and the best organizations and coaches, some comments can be exaggerated, especially in an era that demands near constant content, lists, rankings, and more.

The Heat is known for its culture, and especially the emphasis on toughness and fitness. Many players avoid the Heat; its culture helps to self-select only players with a certain profile, and one that tends toward hard workers and coachability. Player development and role acceptance is easier when players choose to play for you with this understanding.

The current players who have been used to demonstrate the Heat’s player development are Duncan Robinson, Max Strus, Gabe Vincent, and Caleb Martin. Each is a tremendous story in his own right, examples of perseverance, work ethic, and overcoming obstacles that typically exclude players from the NBA. Again, each is an example of scouting, the Heat identifying specific players to fit specific roles, and players working hard and accepting their roles. Miami is selective in its talent identification, willing to take less heralded players who fit their model rather than sign more heralded or higher ranked players who may not fit. Miami knows who it is and who it wants, and these four appear to share those qualities.

However, as examples of the Heat developing shooters, the evidence is less convincing.

Duncan Robinson is the true home-grown talent, an undrafted player who started his college career at an NCAA D3 program and spent a year primarily in the G-League before ascending to near superstardom in the Bubble. Robinson’s three-point shooting statistics are hard to believe.

His percentages decreased year by year through all three seasons at the University of Michigan, shooting 45%, 42.4%, and 38.4% from the three-point line. Somehow, after ignoring his rookie season in which he played sparsely, primarily in the NBA G-League, his three-point field goal percentages have declined year by year with the Heat: 44.6%, 40.8%, 37.2%, and 32.8%.

I have never seen such consistent regression in different settings. Robinson truly is an anomaly, and not just as an NCAA D3 player in the NBA. However, he provides no evidence of the Heat’s effectiveness in developing shooters, and potentially demonstrates the opposite, although his overall games has improved, as evidenced by his cutting and finishing late in the playoffs and the NBA Finals.

Max Strus is an almost true home-grown talent as another undrafted player. Strus started his college career at an NCAA D2 program prior to transferring to DePaul for his final two seasons. He spent his rookie season with the Chicago Bulls’ G-League team, but tore his ACL early in the season, meaning his rookie NBA season was spent primarily in rehab.

He has improved in his second season everywhere he has played. At Lewis, he shot 35.2% and 36.0% in his two seasons. At DePaul, he shot 33.3% and 36.3%. In the NBA, discounting the few months in the G-League as a rookie, he shot 33.8% in his first season in Miami, followed by 41%; his shooting dipped to 35% on three-pointers in his third season.

Many of my junior-college players had similar ups and downs. They improved in their second season playing for me, then their percentages decreased in their first seasons after transferring before rebounding in their fourth seasons as they adapted to the new coach and new level. We should expect players to improve between their first and second seasons at almost any level due to adapting to the new demands, coach, teammates, system, and more.

Strus’ fourth NBA season will be interesting; does his three-point shooting percentage rebound back to 41% or higher or was that season an anomaly, and he is closer to a 35-36% as his total career averages suggest?

Gabe Vincent is another player used as an example of Miami’s player development as an undrafted player from the Big West Conference (UCSB) who spent time in the NBA G-League before breaking through. However, he started his NBA G-League career with Sacramento’s G-League franchise, not in the Heat organization.

Vincent’s three-point shooting percentages in his four years of college declined until his senior season: 41.6%, 38.5%, 32.9%, and 37.7%, for a total of 37.6%. Next, he played most of two seasons for the Stockton Kings before moving to Sioux Falls, the Heat’s G-League franchise, for the final 11 games of his second professional season in 2019-20. He improved from 29.1% as a rookie to 42.1% through 24 games in his second season with Stockton, and 36.9% in the final 11 games with Sioux Falls, for a total of 40.3% in his second G-League season. He was named  NBA G-League’s Most Improved Player for the 2019-20 season.

He played limited minutes with Miami in 2019-20, shooting 22.2% on 27 3FGA. In his three full seasons with the Heat, he improved from 30.9% to 36.8% and then back to 33.4%.

His three-point shooting percentages are all over the place, but history suggests he likely is better than his 2022-23 percentages. However, his shooting percentages in Miami do not demonstrate shooting development, as he has shot worse than his percentages in college and the G-League (although obviously against better talent/defense). I imagine his shooting stabilizes around 36%, like his second season and similar to his college percentages.

Caleb Martin certainly turned heads while playing for the Heat, but the Heat was not his first NBA team. Martin also played four years of college basketball, starting at NC State and finishing at Nevada. He shot 30.5% and 36.1% at NC State before sitting out for one season as a transfer. In his first season at Nevada, he shot 40.3%, before dropping to 33.8%.

In limited appearances as a rookie for Charlotte, he shot 54.1% (20/37), but dropped to 24.8% in his second season. In his first season in Miami, he bounced back to 41.3%, and then fall to 35.6%.

His shooting has yet to show consistency from year to year, although this may be the first time he has settled into a consistent role and playing time. I would expect him to stabilize as a roughly league-average three-point shooter in the 36% region.

These four certainly performed better in Miami and became legitimate NBA contributors and starters, which few would have predicted during their NCAA careers. Something positive happens in South Beach, and Jaime Jacquez fits a similar profile as a four-year, experienced player, despite being a 1st Round pick with greater notoriety and expectations due to his UCLA career. Jacquez saw a big jump in his sophomore season in three-point field goal percentage, then regression for his final two seasons: 31.3% to 39.4%, then 27.6% and 31.7%.

In each instance, Miami identified players who had had shooting success previously, although their percentages had dropped, likely contributing to their availability. They were older for the potential curve, closer to their peak than drafting and developing an 18 or 19-year old, but this also provided more film, and a more knowledgeable evaluation.

Miami is known as a franchise that does things its own way. Their foundation — from ownership to Riley to Spoelstra — and their culture self-selects players who are more mature and maybe who have something to prove. Their culture, environment, and talent identification seem to be second to none, but their shooting development appears overstated based on the statistics. In several cases, it seems whatever transitions or changes occurred between year 1 and year 2 in the Heat organization need to be continued to maintain consistency for subsequent seasons.

All stats from Basketball Reference.

Decision-making — deciding whether or not to shoot — is a part of shooting, and shooting drills should incorporate these decisions. Here is a progression, based on an article from Fake Fundamentals, Volume 4, to show a progression from simple to complex, in terms of increasing decision-making and the drive/pass/shot decision into shooting drills.

Partner Shooting

As a two-player drill, Partner Shooting does not include the passing option. However, players read the closeout and decide to shoot or drive, so it is a simple drill to use as a starting point.

4v1 Spanish Shooting

4v1 Spanish Shooting eliminates dribbling, reducing the decision-making to a pass/shot decision. With a big offensive advantage (4v1), players should shoot only open shots, so this works as a beginner shooting drill.

4v2 Serbia Shooting

4v2 Serbia Shooting eliminates dribbling, reducing the decision-making to a pass/shot decision. With a big offensive advantage (4v2), players should shoot only open shots.

4v3 Serbia Shooting

4v3 Serbia Shooting eliminates dribbling, reducing the decision-making to a pass/shot decision. With a small offensive advantage (4v3), players should shoot open shots.

3-Player String Shooting

Three-player drill incorporating movement and decision-making. On the catch, players have option to shoot, drive and kick, or pass; the pass directly after the catch is used less frequently because of the spacing. On a pass out, players close out, so players begin to read the defense when making the drive/pass/shot decision.

5-Player String Shooting

5-Player String Shooting is 3v2, but restricted to catch-and-shoot attempts (because it is a shooting drill). On the catch, players can drive, pass, or shoot; when they drive, they drive to touch the paint (thee-second area) and kick. Defense closes out and contests shots.

3v3 Wildcat Rules

3v3 game with an emphasis on penetrate and kick and shooting. Players can receive a pass only outside the three-point line (initial rules). On the catch, they can drive, pass, or shoot.

Summary

There are many drills a coach can use to progress and regress based on players’ needs. These incorporate different levels of decision-making into shooting drills rather than practicing shooting only in isolated or individual drills devoid of the game context.