Some examples of the various drills from the general movement series I use as Specific Practice. The various movements are used for different reasons for different players, but generally to encourage exploration in the pursuit of more optimal shooting techniques.

For more information, see Evolution of 180 Shooter: A 21st Century Guide.

String Shooting is a shooting and spacing drill with several variations from simple to more complex.

Group Drill

Same drill, but with the second ball to the player who does not receive the pass to shoot.

Same original drill, but with three players only to make the drill continuous.

The same drill, but with a fourth player to add a defender.

And with a fifth player to create a three-vs-two drill.

Finally, 3v3 Wildcat.

Prior to Evolution of 180 Shooter: A 21st Century Guide, I remarked that my team did not do any form shooting during our practices, while shooting 37.4% from the three-point line and 72.6% from the free-throw line, both of which ranked in the NJCAA top 10. Naturally, someone replied, “Maybe you would have shot better if you did form shooting.”

Most coaches believe form shooting (Fake Fundamentals, Vol. 3) is the first step to great shooting performance.

If your shooting workouts don’t incorporate form shooting close to the basket, you won’t reach your potential as a shooter.

— Coach Mac 🏀 (@BballCoachMac) March 30, 2024

Therefore, incorporating form shooting should improve anyone’s shooting percentages regardless of current success. Nobody questions form shooting’s effectiveness despite the differences between most form shooting and game shots. Most great shooters start with form shooting, which confirms our beliefs. Form shooting is important, and it works, and therefore it is logical to suggest we would have improved by incorporating form shooting despite ranking in the top 10 in three-point and free-throw shooting. Few disagree.

We do not live in the multiverse, or at least we currently cannot access it, so we cannot test this hypothetical. We cannot re-play the season with the same players attempting the same shots against the same opponents, but with different practice drills. The statement is unfalsifiable.

People hold onto their beliefs, rather than accept evidence to the contrary, because we have confirmation bias, which is the tendency to favor information confirming or strengthening one’s beliefs or values, while disregarding contradictory information.  My example of elite shooting without form shooting is dismissed and does not affect entrenched beliefs.

I thought of this as people posted about Oakland University’s Jack Gohlke’s workouts after his monumental NCAA Tournament performance. Gohlke made 10 three-pointers against Kentucky, one short of the NCAA Men’s Basketball Tournament record, and another six in Oakland’s second-round loss.

He shot 37.6% from behind the three-point line this season, which ranked 63rd in NCAA Division 1 men’s basketball, roughly the same as our team’s shooting percentage.

Nobody questioned Gohlke’s shooting routine. Nobody suggested a different approach would have led to more success or better shooting percentages. Instead, coaches created posters to hang in their locker rooms to demonstrate to their players the work required to succeed at the NCAA Division 1 level.

The message is important; success requires effort and dedication. However, coaches latched onto this message, as opposed to my message about the lack of form shooting, because it fits their current beliefs. Gohlke’s extensive shooting routine confirmed their bias toward repetitions, practice hours, and grinding.

Nobody cared that while he is a great shooter, he was far from the best shooter this season. We played at a different competitive level, and obviously different genders, but our team had five shooters shoot better than 37.6% from the three-point line, and four on reasonably high volume (To preempt criticism, the best men’s shooter I trained as a shooting coach shot 42% from three-point line for his NCAA D1 career with a season-high of 46.1% and broke conference three-point shooting records).

One may argue shooting is more difficult in NCAA men’s basketball than women’s basketball, but statistics argue differently. NCAA D1 men’s basketball averaged 33-34% from the three-point line in the regular season this year, compared to 31-32% for NCAA D1 women’s basketball. From that perspective, our percentage was further from average than was Gohlke’s. Here are the shots from our 5th best shooter (by percentage) who was near his season percentage:

This is not to take away anything from Gohlke, as he is a great shooter who had a great season and provided the biggest highlight of the first weekend of the Men’s NCAA Tournament. Instead, this simply is to demonstrate our confirmation bias when it comes to skill development, shooting, practice design, and coaching. Coaches hold onto their beliefs, and find examples to confirm their biases, rather than search out new information or try new things that may help their players improve more or perform better during games. They rely on repetitions as the magic cure; but how many repetitions? Nobody can say.

Nobody will suggest, “Maybe if he practiced less or practiced differently he would have shot even better” because people believe in repetitions, block practice, and spot shooting. Coaches want their players to invest in this practice, even when other practice led to better results.

In all likelihood, any player investing this much time in shooting will improve. 750 shots in a day is a lot of shots. At the end of the day, that is the ultimate goal, regardless of the practice design.

What if the time spent accumulating these repetitions to demonstrate slight shooting improvements meant less time to improve weaknesses, such as speed, defense, dribbling, and more? He shot 38.2% for his NCAA D2 career, and 40.0% in his final NCAA D2 season. There are different ways to demonstrate shooting improvements, but his shooting percentages have been consistent since he began to receive consistent playing time. Maintaining those percentages at an NCAA D1 level against theoretically better, bigger, faster defenses is one way to demonstrate improvement. However, he also took eight shots inside the three-point line all season; maybe the volume of shooting practice prevented other improvements.

Coaches resists change because of confirmation bias due to examples such as Gohlke. A huge volume of practice led to a great shooting performance. See, practice more. Get your butt in the gym.

Just as I cannot prove form shooting would not have led to better shooting with my team, I cannot prove Gohlke would have shot the same or better percentage with less or different practice. It is unfalsifiable.

My evidence for our practice, however, is our players. Almost without exception, they shot lower percentages before and after their two junior-college seasons. This is a within-subjects design: We can compare the results from the same players who encountered two or more different training environments. Of course, it is far from objective, as too many variables affect shooting performance: Most prominently, different competitive levels, but also shot selection, system of play, coach, teammates, defense, and more.  For all I know, our shooting success was largely due to the players liking each other or playing together in a positive emotional state as opposed to the other environments in which they played before and after transferring. Practice design may not have had any effect.

However, for the most part, players changed their practice during their two years at junior college, engaging in more contested shooting and decision-making shooting practice through small-sided games and modified shooting drills than before or after. Many, once transferring to NCAA D1 programs, never practiced these shots again. Some teams used only isolated, block shooting drills during practice; others did not even practice shooting, relying instead on players to shoot on a shooting machine on their own time. Many coaches view our shooting drills as scrimmaging or playing and not true skill development, and do not incorporate them.

The players went through many changes when they transferred. It is difficult to compare situations, systems, styles of play, shot selection, playing time, opponents, and more. However, every single player shot better when practicing with more variable, defended, and decision-making shooting drills than when they no longer engaged in this practice.

Of course, this does not confirm the typical coaching bias, so coaches ignore these results, and attribute the differences to playing at a higher level (which is debatable, as we played opponents with multiple high-major players, whereas most of our players transferred to low-major programs) or the players not practicing hard enough.

This is not to suggest repetitions play no role in shooting development, nor is this in any way a criticism of Gohlke. Instead, this simply demonstrates the power of confirmation bias and seeking information to affirm our beliefs rather than questioning our current processes. How can we develop better players, or develop into better coaches, if we only trust the information confirming our current beliefs?

Originally published in Hard2Guard Player Development Newsletter, Volume 7.

I met a player who visited local universities in an attempt to earn a scholarship. No offer was forthcoming, and she signed with my junior-college program. I told her she attempted too many long two-point shots and had to shoot three-pointers this season (I recruited her as a 4, and she plays 2-5). When she arrived, she attempted three-point shots, but threw the ball rather than shooting. She used a long forward step with her right (shooting) foot and flung the ball at the basket with a flat trajectory. 

I initially directed her to shoot the ball higher, as I hoped this cue would encourage her to shoot up rather than out and lead to a technique shift. This did not help, as her lower body and upper body attempted to do different things; the lower body moved horizontally as the upper body moved vertically. The cue did not disrupt her long step. She regressed to her previous, comfortable technique after a few shots. 

Next, I asked her to jump into her shot rather than attempt other minor modifications. She jumped in different directions in one workout. She shot off hops and leaps onto one foot to prevent the long step-in footwork. She adopted the jump into her shot after a few workouts. The upper body essentially fixed itself. 

In October, she made her first five three-pointers and dominated a scrimmage with several NCAA DI programs in the gym.

Our assistant coach often yelled or mumbled that she was traveling as she made these changes. She did. She often caught the ball flat-footed, jumped into the air, landed, and jumped again to shoot. I rarely said anything through August and September, only occasionally instructing her to catch with feet in the air or to get her feet there more quickly. I was not concerned with her traveling; I was concerned with her shooting. We discussed the traveling once she was comfortable with her new shooting technique. 

Now, she often leaps into a one-two step, but her footwork is closer to a jump stop or one-count than the elongated step she used in August. She plays four positions, likely will shoot > 35% from the three-point line this season, and has committed to an NCAA DII program with a full scholarship for next year. 

Improving one skill was the difference between no scholarship offers and a full scholarship offer. Her improvement derived from one change, from my perspective. I perturbed her skill performance by requiring her to jump into the shot rather than step in to the shot. To amplify these perturbations, she jumped from different directions (90-degrees, 180-degrees, lateral, backward, etc.), and included hops and leaps and shots off of one foot. These perturbations differentiated the desired shooting technique from the habitual shooting technique, and she made significant changes, and improvements, in a matter of weeks at an age (20) when many coaches believe it is impossible to change one’s shooting technique. 

The lesson is not that a one-count is better than a two-count. The jump corrected a problem quicker and more permanently than attempting to alter the length of her step. Now that her new shot is somewhat habitual, she occasionally steps in to her shot or leaps into her shot with a one-two step with both feet off the ground on the catch and a left-right landing. She is able to vary her shooting footwork without reverting to her previous (flawed) shooting technique. She has learned a new shooting technique and demonstrated improvement, retention, adaptability, and transfer.

Note: These ideas and more are included in Evolution of 180 Shooter: A 21st Century Guide.

Kevin Pelton is one of the best writers on ESPN and included this review of the Miami Heat’s pick in his overall review of the 2023 NBA Draft. This is a familiar refrain within the NBA and NBA media: Miami Heat develop players, and especially shooters. I am a Miami Heat fan and believe Eric Spoelstra is the best coach in the NBA, but, to me, this demonstrates the idea that once repeated enough, an idea becomes a fact.

People oftentimes confuse scouting and development, or at least the line between scouting and development is blurred and difficult to separate. The Heat play an unusually high number of undrafted players, which we equate with great player development. Why not scouting? Why not coaching?

We assume players must have improved greatly to go from undrafted to rotation players or G-League to NBA starters because we largely ignore the effect of environment on player performance. The Heat likely are the best organization at identifying the players who fit their style, their system, and their organization. They know who they are, and what they want, largely because of consistency and alignment in management and coaching with Pat Riley and Spoelstra. These players may excel in Miami simply because the organization identifies players who fit, and Spoelstra and staff give them opportunities and the confidence to play to their strengths and play through mistakes.

This is not to discount the coaching or the player development. Clearly, something happens to certain players in Miami, whether scouting, playing time, coaching, system, player development, or a combination. Miami is the NBA’s model franchise (along with San Antonio). However, even with the models and the best organizations and coaches, some comments can be exaggerated, especially in an era that demands near constant content, lists, rankings, and more.

The Heat is known for its culture, and especially the emphasis on toughness and fitness. Many players avoid the Heat; its culture helps to self-select only players with a certain profile, and one that tends toward hard workers and coachability. Player development and role acceptance is easier when players choose to play for you with this understanding.

The current players who have been used to demonstrate the Heat’s player development are Duncan Robinson, Max Strus, Gabe Vincent, and Caleb Martin. Each is a tremendous story in his own right, examples of perseverance, work ethic, and overcoming obstacles that typically exclude players from the NBA. Again, each is an example of scouting, the Heat identifying specific players to fit specific roles, and players working hard and accepting their roles. Miami is selective in its talent identification, willing to take less heralded players who fit their model rather than sign more heralded or higher ranked players who may not fit. Miami knows who it is and who it wants, and these four appear to share those qualities.

However, as examples of the Heat developing shooters, the evidence is less convincing.

Duncan Robinson is the true home-grown talent, an undrafted player who started his college career at an NCAA D3 program and spent a year primarily in the G-League before ascending to near superstardom in the Bubble. Robinson’s three-point shooting statistics are hard to believe.

His percentages decreased year by year through all three seasons at the University of Michigan, shooting 45%, 42.4%, and 38.4% from the three-point line. Somehow, after ignoring his rookie season in which he played sparsely, primarily in the NBA G-League, his three-point field goal percentages have declined year by year with the Heat: 44.6%, 40.8%, 37.2%, and 32.8%.

I have never seen such consistent regression in different settings. Robinson truly is an anomaly, and not just as an NCAA D3 player in the NBA. However, he provides no evidence of the Heat’s effectiveness in developing shooters, and potentially demonstrates the opposite, although his overall games has improved, as evidenced by his cutting and finishing late in the playoffs and the NBA Finals.

Max Strus is an almost true home-grown talent as another undrafted player. Strus started his college career at an NCAA D2 program prior to transferring to DePaul for his final two seasons. He spent his rookie season with the Chicago Bulls’ G-League team, but tore his ACL early in the season, meaning his rookie NBA season was spent primarily in rehab.

He has improved in his second season everywhere he has played. At Lewis, he shot 35.2% and 36.0% in his two seasons. At DePaul, he shot 33.3% and 36.3%. In the NBA, discounting the few months in the G-League as a rookie, he shot 33.8% in his first season in Miami, followed by 41%; his shooting dipped to 35% on three-pointers in his third season.

Many of my junior-college players had similar ups and downs. They improved in their second season playing for me, then their percentages decreased in their first seasons after transferring before rebounding in their fourth seasons as they adapted to the new coach and new level. We should expect players to improve between their first and second seasons at almost any level due to adapting to the new demands, coach, teammates, system, and more.

Strus’ fourth NBA season will be interesting; does his three-point shooting percentage rebound back to 41% or higher or was that season an anomaly, and he is closer to a 35-36% as his total career averages suggest?

Gabe Vincent is another player used as an example of Miami’s player development as an undrafted player from the Big West Conference (UCSB) who spent time in the NBA G-League before breaking through. However, he started his NBA G-League career with Sacramento’s G-League franchise, not in the Heat organization.

Vincent’s three-point shooting percentages in his four years of college declined until his senior season: 41.6%, 38.5%, 32.9%, and 37.7%, for a total of 37.6%. Next, he played most of two seasons for the Stockton Kings before moving to Sioux Falls, the Heat’s G-League franchise, for the final 11 games of his second professional season in 2019-20. He improved from 29.1% as a rookie to 42.1% through 24 games in his second season with Stockton, and 36.9% in the final 11 games with Sioux Falls, for a total of 40.3% in his second G-League season. He was named  NBA G-League’s Most Improved Player for the 2019-20 season.

He played limited minutes with Miami in 2019-20, shooting 22.2% on 27 3FGA. In his three full seasons with the Heat, he improved from 30.9% to 36.8% and then back to 33.4%.

His three-point shooting percentages are all over the place, but history suggests he likely is better than his 2022-23 percentages. However, his shooting percentages in Miami do not demonstrate shooting development, as he has shot worse than his percentages in college and the G-League (although obviously against better talent/defense). I imagine his shooting stabilizes around 36%, like his second season and similar to his college percentages.

Caleb Martin certainly turned heads while playing for the Heat, but the Heat was not his first NBA team. Martin also played four years of college basketball, starting at NC State and finishing at Nevada. He shot 30.5% and 36.1% at NC State before sitting out for one season as a transfer. In his first season at Nevada, he shot 40.3%, before dropping to 33.8%.

In limited appearances as a rookie for Charlotte, he shot 54.1% (20/37), but dropped to 24.8% in his second season. In his first season in Miami, he bounced back to 41.3%, and then fall to 35.6%.

His shooting has yet to show consistency from year to year, although this may be the first time he has settled into a consistent role and playing time. I would expect him to stabilize as a roughly league-average three-point shooter in the 36% region.

These four certainly performed better in Miami and became legitimate NBA contributors and starters, which few would have predicted during their NCAA careers. Something positive happens in South Beach, and Jaime Jacquez fits a similar profile as a four-year, experienced player, despite being a 1st Round pick with greater notoriety and expectations due to his UCLA career. Jacquez saw a big jump in his sophomore season in three-point field goal percentage, then regression for his final two seasons: 31.3% to 39.4%, then 27.6% and 31.7%.

In each instance, Miami identified players who had had shooting success previously, although their percentages had dropped, likely contributing to their availability. They were older for the potential curve, closer to their peak than drafting and developing an 18 or 19-year old, but this also provided more film, and a more knowledgeable evaluation.

Miami is known as a franchise that does things its own way. Their foundation — from ownership to Riley to Spoelstra — and their culture self-selects players who are more mature and maybe who have something to prove. Their culture, environment, and talent identification seem to be second to none, but their shooting development appears overstated based on the statistics. In several cases, it seems whatever transitions or changes occurred between year 1 and year 2 in the Heat organization need to be continued to maintain consistency for subsequent seasons.

All stats from Basketball Reference.

Decision-making — deciding whether or not to shoot — is a part of shooting, and shooting drills should incorporate these decisions. Here is a progression, based on an article from Fake Fundamentals, Volume 4, to show a progression from simple to complex, in terms of increasing decision-making and the drive/pass/shot decision into shooting drills.

Partner Shooting

As a two-player drill, Partner Shooting does not include the passing option. However, players read the closeout and decide to shoot or drive, so it is a simple drill to use as a starting point.

4v1 Spanish Shooting

4v1 Spanish Shooting eliminates dribbling, reducing the decision-making to a pass/shot decision. With a big offensive advantage (4v1), players should shoot only open shots, so this works as a beginner shooting drill.

4v2 Serbia Shooting

4v2 Serbia Shooting eliminates dribbling, reducing the decision-making to a pass/shot decision. With a big offensive advantage (4v2), players should shoot only open shots.

4v3 Serbia Shooting

4v3 Serbia Shooting eliminates dribbling, reducing the decision-making to a pass/shot decision. With a small offensive advantage (4v3), players should shoot open shots.

3-Player String Shooting

Three-player drill incorporating movement and decision-making. On the catch, players have option to shoot, drive and kick, or pass; the pass directly after the catch is used less frequently because of the spacing. On a pass out, players close out, so players begin to read the defense when making the drive/pass/shot decision.

5-Player String Shooting

5-Player String Shooting is 3v2, but restricted to catch-and-shoot attempts (because it is a shooting drill). On the catch, players can drive, pass, or shoot; when they drive, they drive to touch the paint (thee-second area) and kick. Defense closes out and contests shots.

3v3 Wildcat Rules

3v3 game with an emphasis on penetrate and kick and shooting. Players can receive a pass only outside the three-point line (initial rules). On the catch, they can drive, pass, or shoot.

Summary

There are many drills a coach can use to progress and regress based on players’ needs. These incorporate different levels of decision-making into shooting drills rather than practicing shooting only in isolated or individual drills devoid of the game context.

The answer for improvement or skill development is more: More time, more reps, more practice. How many more? How much time or practice is required? Many coaches cite the 10,000-hour rule, but none exists (see Fake Fundamentals, Vol. 3 for more information).

When more is emphasized, the how is de-emphasized. Instead, anything that looks good or looks like it practices something important is called skill development.

I posted this drill last week; this is from the morning shooting workout for a professional team. Many would suggest this is skill development. The shots are directly from our sets and, for many, are “game shots from game spots at game speeds” (see Fake Fundamentals, Vol. 2 for why I would not). People liked the drill and commented on its use of different skills. This is just a drill to me; it is not skill development.

We used this drill at the morning practice, which was followed by an evening team practice, on the day before a game. I took over the team midseason with the schedule and expectations set. I would change things if I was in complete control. The purpose of this workout, especially the day before a game, was to “get up shots”: Increase confidence by seeing the ball go through the hoop. This is focused on performance (game the next day), and not learning (long term). It worked, I suppose, as the players pictured combined to go 10/19 from the 3-point line the next day. This, of course, is performance; one game does not mean we shoot 53% from behind the 3-point arc.

I like the drill, as drills go, because it combines multiple skills; it’s variable, random practice: The drill incorporates different versions of different skills in each repetition. The two-ball dribbling forces different passes; players employ different finishes; and the shots, while similar, vary slightly from rep to rep because of the movement. The timing, the catch, the footwork, the location, and more vary. From this standpoint, the drill is better than a spot shooting drill with one player attempting X shots in a row. Despite its apparent success, and the positives, I still consider this a drill, and not skill development. How do we differentiate “skill development” from “drills”?

What is skill development? Skill is “is the learned ability to bring out the pre-determined results with maximum certainty, often with the minimum outlay of time, energy or both” (Knapp, 1963). Development is “the process of developing or being developed”, which is “to grow or cause to grow and become more mature, advanced, or elaborate.” Therefore, we might say skill development is the process of growing, advancing or making more elaborate the learned ability to bring out the pre-determined results with maximum certainty, often with the minimum outlay of time, energy or both.” In terms of shooting, skill development improves accuracy (increased shooting percentages), but also builds more advanced or elaborate skills: Increased range, quicker release, harder shots (step-backs), and more.

In context, skill development is the process by which one improves skill. Ultimately,  these improvements are measured through game performance. Therefore, when discussing drills in the context of skill development, we should understand how the activity impacts one or more aspects of the skill (accuracy, distance, quickness) and transfers to the game.

This drill is not “game shooting” because there was no defense or decisions. Deciding to shoot is a part of game shooting (see Evolution of 180 Shooter: A 21st Century Guide for more), but the drill determined the specific shooter on each repetition. The drill does not practice or improve “game shooting” directly because shooters do not improve their reading of the defense, feel for openness, perception of a defender’s proximity, and more. Any improvements must be more indirect, as the shooting is removed from the game context, despite it appearing similar to the shots from one of our sets.

 

This is where the drill, and more drills, fall short. This is a group activity, a team drill. Each player performs the same skills. From a general standpoint, this is good: You can see our starting center practicing 2-ball dribbling drills and making one-hand passes off the dribble. For some, these skills improve slightly because of lack of previous exposure: A player who has never dribbled 2 balls will improve her ability to dribble 2 balls through this drill, just as someone who rarely has practiced one-hand passes will improve this ability through increased exposure/repetitions. However, this was primarily a shooting drill (“get up shots”), and none of the players lacks previous exposure to shooting jump shots.

How does a player improve individually through a team drill? Does this drill meet the specific needs of each player? Does it improve shooting accuracy? Speed? Range? Footwork?

It is possible. I instructed players to pick one thing to improve in drills rather than expecting magical improvements from doing drills. My guess is, at most, 2 players in this group listened and changed their behaviors (concentration, focus, emphasis). There may be something specific they are practicing; one player is trying to quicken her release by limiting the dip on her shot. It is possible, if she concentrates, this drill (and others) can improve her shooting through this mechanism. However, this is not the specific drill I would choose to focus on that specific change; there are better, more specific drills.

Drills are a tool; they are not skill development. They may assist with skill development when used correctly by players and coaches, but performing a drill is not skill development. Too often, we rely on doing more to improve players, and every year, this approach fails players. There are different ways to improve a skill such as shooting, and when designing drills, whether for an individual or a group, we should understand the processes by which we expect the drill to improve accuracy, speed, or skill elaboration and transfer to the game. Without that understanding, and without the proper feedback from the coach and concentration from the player, drills are just work; exercise and activity one hopes may impact future performance positively.

FAQs

What are some specific examples of “game-like” shooting drills that can bridge the gap between drills and in-game performance? “Game-like” shooting drills require defenders, decision-making, and at least one passing option. For example:

 

Coaches should customize drills to mimic the pace, intensity, and decision-making aspects of real games.

How can a coach or player assess whether their shooting drills are effectively translating into improved game performance? Assessing the effectiveness of shooting drills involves tracking performance metrics over time. This could include shooting percentages from different spots on the court, shot selection during games, and overall shooting accuracy in game situations. Video analysis can also be helpful, allowing players and coaches to review how well the skills practiced in drills translate to actual game footage. Additionally, feedback from coaches, teammates, and self-reflection can provide valuable insights into whether the training is making a difference in game performance.

Are there any potential drawbacks or pitfalls to avoid when designing or implementing shooting drills for skill development? When designing shooting drills, avoid drills that don’t translate well to actual game situations. For example, overly repetitive drills that don’t challenge decision-making or shot selection may not improve game performance. Additionally, drills that focus solely on shooting without incorporating other skills like footwork, ball-handling, and court awareness might not be comprehensive enough. Another pitfall is neglecting to adjust drills based on individual player needs; what works for one player may not work for another. Coaches should be mindful of overloading players with too many drills, which could lead to burnout or diminished focus.

Here are the videos mentioned in a recent article about organizing a youth basketball practice with only a half-court.

2v2 Rugby

3v3 Hockey

Chaser Layups

Foster’s 1v1 variations

Wildcat Rules

No Dribble

Canada Rules

 

The Box and One has an interesting look at free-throw success as an indicator of future three-point shooting success. This is a common trope that many draft analysts use when evaluating potential, but one that I believe is generally overblown. The article is a good examination.

One name caught my eye because of a single interaction I had with the player. I had no idea he had been an ~80% free-throw shooter in college, as I saw him working out as an NBA player with a “shooting expert” attempting to change his entire shooting technique (to look more like the expert’s shooting style despite their differences in size, athleticism, position, and era).

I have written about this workout previously. During the workout, sitting along the sideline, another player development coach/ex-NBA player asked my thoughts. I offered them. He actually thought I had a point, and at one point, he went to the shooting expert and relayed some of what I had said. The shooting expert scoffed at my evaluation and continued to instruct the player to shoot exactly as he had.

I was just a guy watching a workout. Nobody introduced me to the shooting expert. I only spoke to the ex-player because he introduced himself to me and asked my opinion. I’m not one to say much in this environment, but if you ask, I’m also not one to hold back my opinion. I did not expect the shooting expert to agree, nor did I care. He clearly saw only one specific thing; I take a much broader view of shooting, and skill development in general. These differences are easily explainable by our backgrounds and experiences.

After the workout finished, the shooting expert left. The player was still there. He was talking to the coach who I knew in the gym, the reason for my presence. I was introduced to the player. The coach or the player asked my opinion, so I asked the player if he danced when he was out in the club.

The coach and the player were confused. Why is this dude asking about dancing in a club? I asked again. He clearly had no idea how to respond. Finally, I told him that if he doesn’t dance, he should spend his summer taking a Zumba class because he had no rhythm. I think I offended him.

I explained that regardless of the drill, he had no rhythm. He had no rhythm when doing straight-line dribbling drills. He had no rhythm in some of the dynamic warmups. He had no rhythm when he shot.

He was, by all accounts, a great athlete: Big, strong, and a huge vertical jump, when judged by his dunks. However, he was not rhythmic. His movements, especially with the ball, did not appear well-coordinated or well-organized.

This, to me, was his shooting problem, not his “technique”, and 80% free-throw shooting would support this conclusion. Like most shooting coaches, the shooting expert focused on his upper-body. His feedback centered on his dip, his elbow, his follow-through, and more. This is very common. If he shoots ~80% from the free-throw line, are these issues really the problem?

To me, if we cannot coordinate the movements, we will never correct any upper-body problems. Instead, if we improve our coordination of the movement, starting from the feet, the “errors” of the upper body often fix themselves.

I told him that a summer of Zumba would improve his shooting more than a summer of workouts like the one I witnessed. I still believe the same. His shooting percentage has improved slightly. Maybe all the technique practice worked. Of course, based on his college free-throw percentages, one might expect him to shoot better; his NBA and NCAA three-point shooting percentages are pretty similar. This shows some improvement (shooting the same percentage at a further distance), but not the improvement that his franchise wanted and expected.

Who knows what would have happened if he had listened to me? However, by following the shooting expert’s instructions, he has had minimal progression over his career. Maybe shooting development is more than technical instruction and immediate, constant feedback. Maybe each player has his own individual technique, and attempting to make players shoot exactly like some model is not the best way to develop shooters. Or maybe I’m just a guy at the keyboard who has never trained NBA players and doesn’t know what he’s talking about. Lots of possibilities.